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Abstract 
Scalable secure key distribution is the most important 
feature of a scalable secure group communication protocol. 
Most of the existing scalable secure group communication 
protocols are based on a hierarchical key distribution tree. 
These schemes can be classified as  hierarchical node based 
schemes and hierarchical key based schemes. In this paper; 
we compare recently proposed hierarchical key distribution 
schemes through simulation using real-life multicast group 
membership traces. Our simulations show that hierarchi- 
cal node based approaches better distribute encryption cost 
among the entities of a multicast group. Howevet hierar- 
chical node based schemes “trust” internal nodes of a key 
distribution tree. We show that the dual encryption protocol 
recently proposed by us overcomes the aforementioned lim- 
itation of hierarchical node based schemes, with a marginal 
performance penalty. 
1. Introduction 
Multicasting is a scalable way of transmitting data to 
a group of hosts. Several multicast applications, includ- 
ing data streaming applications, collaborative applications 
may require secure data transmission [SI. Members of a 
multicast session must not be able to access the multicast 
data transmitted before their membership has begun or after 
their membership has expired. Thus, in dynamic multicast 
groups, where members join and leave during the multicast 
session, the secret keys need to be updated each time the 
membership changes. Scalability in this context implies that 
the overhead involved in key updates, data transmission and 
encryption must be independent of the size of the multicast 
group, The other requirement of scalability is that the ad- 
dition or removal of a host from the group must not affect 
all the members of the group. This requirement is called “1 
affects n” scalability problem [6]. 
Several protocols have been proposed to support scalable 
secure multicasting [2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 101. Most of these pro- 
tocols distribute encryption keys via a distribution tree. We 
can classify the tree-based approaches into two groups. The 
first class uses a hierarchy of keys [4.8,9,  101 while the sec- 
ond uses a hierarchy of nodes [2, 61 to achieve scalability. 
The hierarchical key based schemes suffer from the I af- 
fects n scalability problem. Some hierarchical node based 
schemes [6] entrust internal nodes of the key-distribution 
tree with the distribution of the encryption keys. But they 
offer no mechanism to hide secure multicast data from the 
internal nodes. We recently proposed a dual encryption pro- 
tocol (DEP) [2] which provides the capability to deny access 
of secure multicast data to third party entities. 
In this paper, we compare the en(de)cryption cost at 
the sender, members and internal nodes (where applicable) 
of the key distribution tree in the hierarchical approaches, 
through simulation. In particular, we compare the proto- 
cols’ performance as the multicast group sizes increase. We 
use real-life multicast traces [ 11 of a few multicast sessions 
in the MBone to simulate real world behavior. Our simula- 
tions show that hierarchical node based schemes incur less 
encryption cost than hierarchical key based schemes. The 
node based schemes also better distribute the cost among 
the entities of a key distribution tree and their Performance 
benefits increase with group size. We show that DEP incurs 
only a marginal increase in encryption cost while eliminat- 
ing the need to trust third parties. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we provide a classification of scalable secure multicast pro- 
tocols used in our comparison study. We characterize the 
workload and describe it in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
the simulation results in detail. The final section summarizes 
our conclusions. 
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2. Classification of secure multicast protocols multicast group size in real-life traces collected from various 
Most of the previous work in the area of secure multi- 
casting has been in key distribution. In a majority of the 
proposed scalable key distribution schemes [2,6, 8,9, lo], 
the members of the multicast group are part of a tree-like 
hierarchical structure. We classify these protocols into hi- 
erarchical key based schemes and hierarchical node based 
schemes. In hierarchical key based schemes, the sender or 
a group manager distributes a set of key encrypting keys 
(KEK) to each member, based on the member’s location in 
the tree. The sender uses the KEKs to securely send new 
KEKs and the session key to members. Hierarchical node 
based schemes employ internal nodes of the tree as subgroup 
managers (SGM), which assist in key distribution. These in- 
ternal nodes may not be members of the multicast group. 
SGMs also forward data encryption keys (DEK) received 
from the sender, to their subgroup members. While hier- 
archical node based schemes [6] support distributed group 
management, they expose secret keys to the internal nodes, 
which may be third party entities. 
For our comparison study, we choose one hierarchical 
key based scheme, the Centralized Tree-Based Key Man- 
agement scheme (CTKM) [8, 9, 101, and one hierarchical 
node based scheme, Iolus [6]. Since Iolus “trusts” internal 
nodes of a key distribution tree, we include DEP [2], which 
does not trust the internal nodes, in our comparison. CTKM 
has been proposed independently with minor variations by 
several research groups. For our study we use the protocol 
as described by Wong et. a1 [lo]. We compare the charac- 
teristics of the aforementioned protocols in Table 1. 
IMS WorM Radio Network Sesslon 
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Figure 1. Group size in IMS session 
3. Workload characterization 
In order to simulate real world behavior, we use real-life 
multicast group membership traces collected by Almeroth 
e?. a1 [ l ]  as our workload. In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the 
multicast sessions’. 
The sessions differ in inter-arrival rates of members, 
membership durations and popularity of sessions as indi- 
cated by the number of simultaneous members in the ses- 
sions. Notice that the popularity of a session plays an im- 
portant role in the multicast key distribution as it governs 
the size of the distribution tree. In the rest of the discus- 
sion, we use activity in a session and popularity of a session 
interchangeably. 
NASA STS-71 Session 
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Figure 2. Group size in STS-71 session 
In the IMS World Radio Network Session the number 
of simultaneous members is more than 15 but less than 40 
(refer to Figure 1). The session lasted more than a week [I]. 
The NASA shuttle mission session STS-7 1 broadcasting the 
docking of the Space Shuttle and Space Station Mir over 
the MBone [ l ]  is a more popular session. For most of the 
time the number of simultaneous members is more than one 
hundred, and more than three hundred at its peak (shown in 
Figure 2). This session lasted more than two weeks. 
4. Performance comparison using simulation 
In this section we compare the scalable key distribution 
approaches through simulation. We develop a simulation 
model in C using the CSIM [7] simulation package. In the 
model we simulate the join and leave operations following 
each of the three key distribution schemes and DEK distri- 
bution in case of DEP and Iolus. 
Recall that scalable encryption cost is one of the most im- 
portant requirements of a key distribution scheme. There- 
fore, we compute the per session encryption cost at the 
sender and constitute the comparative study. In case of 
CTKM, we build a virtual key distribution tree and use it 
as a reference to determine the number of encryptions nec- 
essary at the sender during each join or leave. To ensure a 
‘For a complete velsion of our study with additional workloads and a 
more detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols refer to [3]. 
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No. of keys in the multicast group 
No. of keys managed by the sender 
No. of keys at a member 
No. of keys at an SGM 
Public key/ Secret key 
Scalable Encryption Cost 
1 affects n scalability 
No. of messages at join 
No. of messages at leave 
Total key encryptions during data transmission 
No. of key encryptions at the sender 
M 
Intermediate nodes 
Iolus CTKM DEP 
n + l + l  $9 n + l + l + c  
2 5% c + 2  o w  ob) O b )  
3 o(bd 4 
5 - 4 
Both Secret Both 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No Yes 
O(1) O(logdn) OC') 
O(0 W l o g d n )  O(1) 
O(0 O(1) O(l+c )  
O(1) O(1) O(C) 
Trusted Not trusted Not trusted 
n: number of members 
c: size of the sender's subgroup 
1: number of subgroups 
1: average size of a subgroup 
d degree 
fair comparison, we assume that the SGMs in DEP and Iolus 
are third party entities. Thus, in case of DEP all SGMs are 
participant SGMs. The sender and the SGMs in DEP and 
Iolus incur local subgroup management costs. Additionally, 
the senders in DEP and Iolus incur DEK encryption costs, 
the SGMs incur DEK translation costs and the members in- 
cur DEK decryption costs. The sender in DEP also incurs a 
unit cost per join in the session, due to KEK distribution. 
Correspondingly each member incurs a one-time unit de- 
cryption cost. Finally, each member of a subgroup incurs 
a unit decryption cost each time a join or leave occurs in the 
subgroup. 
In each simulation the number of encryptions andor de- 
cryptions performed by the sender the members and the 
SGMs were observed. We plot the encryption cost versus 
the degree of the key distribution tree for each of the above 
three schemes. We analyze those plots in the following. 
Each scheme was simulated using the workload de- 
scribed earlier. The performance metrics shown are the join, 
leave and the total encryption costs per session at the sender. 
In the following we present and discuss the results for each 
of these metrics. 
4.1. Encryption cost at the sender 
The per session encryption overhead at the sender for the 
protocols is plotted in Figure 3. The per session join cost 
depicts the cost due to joins at the sender's subgroup and 
the KEK distribution cost. In the figure the rows represent 
the workload used for the simulation, and the columns show 
the number of encryptions during join, leave and the total, 
respectively. 
Observe from Figure 3 (column (i)) that the join cost at 
the sender in CTKM decreases very sharply, and then shows 
' 
more smooth decrease. Join cost at the sender in CTKM is 
approximately equal to 2(logdn),  where d is the degree of 
the key distribution tree and n is the group size [ 101. This 
expression decreases with increasing degree which explains 
the CTKM curves in Figures 3.(i). Figure 3 (column ( i ) )  
also indicates that the per session cost at the sender due to 
joins increases with degree in DEP and Iolus. The per ses- 
sion join cost at the sender is dependent on the size of the 
sender's subgroup, which increases with degree. It also in- 
creases with frequency of joins at the sender. The join cost 
in DEP also includes the KEK distribution cost which is one 
encryption per member in the session. In our simulations, 
the join cost per session at the senders in DEP and Iolus was 
much lower than the cost at the senders in CTKM. More im- 
portantly, the gap between the curves corresponding to DEP 
(Iolus) and CTKM widens as the the number of simultane- 
ous members increases. This shows that DEP (Iolus) can 
scale very well to multicast sessions with large group sizes. 
Figure 34i )  shows that leave cost per session increases 
with degree. At low degree, for both workloads leave cost 
in CTKM is higher than that in DEP and Iolus. In the IMS 
session, for higher values of degree, CTKM performs bet- 
ter than DEP and Iolus. However, DEP and Iolus perform 
better than CTKM in STS-71, the more active session. The 
per leave encryption cost at the sender in CTKM is approxi- 
mately d(logd n) whereas in DEP and Iolus it is proportional 
to size of the top level subgroup. That explains the increase 
in cost as the degree increases. Also in CTKM the sender 
is responsible for the key changes during all leaves. while in 
DEP and Iolus, the sender changes keys only when its local 
subgroup members leave. 
Figure 3.(iii) shows the total cost per session. The to- 
tal cost at the sender during a session in CTKM schemes is 
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Figure 3. Encryption cost at the sender during the session 
(i) Number of encryptions at the sender due to joins vs. degree 
(ii) Number of encryptions at the sender due to leaves vs. degree 
(iii) Total number of encryptions at the sender vs. degree 
the sum of the cost during joins and leaves. The senders in 
DEP and Iolus also incur encryption overhead due to DEK 
distribution in addition to the overhead corresponding to the 
management of the top level subgroup. For a fair compar- 
ison, the DEK in DEP (Iolus) must be changed each time 
a join or leave occurs. Thus, we change the DEK approx- 
imately as many times as there are joins and leaves, in our 
simulations*. Finally, in simulating DEP, we use a single 
KEK for the whole group. 
Figure 3.(iii) indicates that the total cost at the sender in 
CTKM increases with degree after an initial dip. This dip 
indicates that the optimal degree of key distribution tree for 
CTKM is 4, 5 or 6. The cost in DEP and Iolus increases 
with degree. Note that DEK distribution cost is independent 
of degree. The increase in cost with degree is due to the 
increase in subgroup size at the sender with degree. In the 
IMS session (small group size), the cost in DEP and Iolus 
was lower than the cost in CTKM for low values of degree. 
At higher values of degree, CI'KM performed better than 
DEP and Iolus. In the STS-71 session (bigger group size) 
the cost per session is significantly lower in DEP and Io- 
lus than that in CTKM for all values of degree. Also, with 
increasing group sizes, the gap between the cost curves cor- 
~~ 
ZNote that this corresponds to the worst case in DEP (Iolus). Realisti- 
cally, the sender changes the DEK at a frequency dictated by the security 
requirements and performance constraints. 
responding to CTKh4 and DEP (Iolus) increases, showing 
that DEP (Iolus) scales better. 
4.2. Distribution of en(de)cryption cost 
We compute the distribution of total en(de)cryption cost 
at the sender, members and the SGMs in all three schemes 
and plot them as percentages in histograms shown in Fig- 
ure 4. The rows correspond to the workloads while the 
columns correspond to CTKM, Iolus and DEP, respectively. 
These graphs show that the sender in CTKM incurs a larger 
percentage of cost compared to the sender in DEP (Iolus). 
This is because DEP distributes the encryption cost between 
the sender and the SGMs whereas CTKM burdens the sender 
with all the encryption cost. 
4.3. Summary 
We conclude this section with a summary of our obser- 
vations in comparing the three scalable secure multicasting 
protocols. 
0 Hierarchical node based protocols incur less encryp- 
tion cost compared to hierarchical key based protocols. 
They also distribute the cost "evenly" among the enti- 
ties of a multicast group. 
0 Hierarchical node based schemes keep the per member 
cost at the sender independent of the multicast group 
size, whereas cost in hierarchical key based schemes 
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Figure 4. Distribution of en(de)cryption cost 
increases with group size. Consequently, Iolus and 
DEP scale much better than CTKM as the number of 
simultaneous members in a multicast session increases. 
0 Unlike in Iolus, DEP can do away with the so called 
“trusted” third parties (e.g., participant SGMs) incur- 
ring marginally more aggregate cost than Iolus. 
5. Conclusion 
We compared encryptioddecryption cost incurred in var- 
ious secure group communication protocols using real-life 
group membership data. We conclude that hierarchical node 
based approaches fare better than hierarchical key based ap- 
proaches. The performance advantage of hierarchical node 
based approaches increases with the multicast group size. 
While most hierarchical node based approaches automat- 
ically give access of secure multicast data to third party 
hosts which assist in subgroup management, DEP avoids 
that drawback using dual encryption. Although DEP in- 
curs marginal increase in cost due to dual encryption, it is 
more secure than other hierarchical node based approaches, 
while still delivering better performance than hierarchical 
key based approaches. 
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